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V. CONCLUSION ................................. 1202D ESPITE its long-term and generally well-deserved reputation as
a business-friendly state, recent sales tax and franchise tax devel-
opments evidence Texas's increasingly aggressive pursuit of tax
revenue. Whether fueled by the comptroller's desire to increase tax reve-
nue in an uncertain economy, to close perceived loopholes on which tax-
payers rely, or to seek sound tax policy, the result over the last two years
is largely the same: taxpayers find themselves faced with higher bills,
changing tax policies and, equally bad, uncertainty.' In the sales tax
arena, as in the franchise tax arena, the comptroller remains willing to
meet with industry representatives to discuss and resolve issues, including
prospective changes to longstanding administrative rules. On the other
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through October 2012 (two Survey periods). Because the Article covers two years, space
constraints limited the scope of the article and precluded inclusion of some items (e.g.,
some 2011 legislative developments). Key developments for the period from November




hand, the comptroller is also willing to change her interpretation of law to
shore up the agency's position in the midst of ongoing audits and court
cases. Property tax disputes with local taxing jurisdictions, facing their
own costs and challenges, also demonstrate the impact of a taxing author-
ity's practice and procedures, and offer further evidence that tax interpre-
tation and revenue needs are sometimes inextricably linked.
I. SALES TAX: STUDIES IN STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
SCOPE OF TAXATION, EXEMPTIONS, COMPTROLLER
INTERPRETATIONS, LEGISLATION
Several reported cases illustrate the comptroller's efforts to broaden
the scope of the sales and use tax including by narrowly interpreting ex-
emptions to the tax. In Zimmer US, Inc. v. Combs,2 the taxpayer success-
fully argued that some of its out-of-state purchases of surgical
instruments from its non-Texas parent company were exempt under
Texas Tax Code § 151.313.3 Zimmer US, Inc. (Zimmer) sells reconstruc-
tive implants to Texas hospitals and healthcare providers, develops tech-
niques for surgical procedures to implant prosthetics, and lends surgical
instruments to healthcare providers for use during surgery. According to
Zimmer, the items at issue are either exempt orthopedic devices or ex-
empt supplies for orthopedic devices. 4
An important aspect of this case is its focus on the comptroller's effort
to interpret her own rule in a manner that, as the court acknowledged, is
contrary to the language of the rule.5 Rule 3.284, which addresses the
exemption at issue, defines the terms "orthopedic appliance" and "pros-
thetic device." 6 The definition "of orthopedic appliances require" that the
item perform a function "in the correction or prevention of human defor-
mities and does not include the additional requirement that the device
perform its function on an ongoing basis.7 In contrast, the definition of
"prosthetic device" does contain such a requirement.8 Nonetheless, the
comptroller attempted to import this requirement into the definition of
"orthopedic appliance," arguing that an orthopedic appliance or device is
not exempt unless it performs "some function in the actual ongoing cor-
rection or prevention of human deformities."9 The sole issue before the
court of appeals was "whether, in light of this rule," the instruments Zim-
2. Zimmer US, Inc. v. Combs, 368 S.W.3d 579 (Tex. App.-Austin 2012, no pet.).
3. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.313(a)(5) (West 2008) (providing an exemption for
certain health care supplies).
4. Zimmerman US, Inc., 368 S.W.3d at 582.
5. See id. at 586.
6. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.284(a)(12)-(13) (2012) (Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Ac-
counts, Drugs, Medicines, Medicinal Equipment, and Devices).
7. Id. § 3.284(a)(12).
8. Id. § 3.284(a)(13).
9. Zimmer US, Inc., 368 S.W.3d at 586.
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mer had loaned to healthcare providers were exempt pursuant to
§ 151.313(a)(5).10
Zimmer correctly pointed out that the court need "not defer to the
comptroller's interpretation of Rule 3.284(a)" and that the comptroller
should not be allowed to effectively amend the rule without following the
procedures required by the Texas Administrative Procedure Act." The
court agreed that the interpretation urged by the comptroller is inconsis-
tent with the plain language of Rule 3.284.12 As the court explained, the
rule is not ambiguous, but even if it were, the court would not adopt an
interpretation of the rule that would contradict the plain language of a
rule that reasonably interprets the Tax Code.13
Particularly given the efforts of both taxpayers and the comptroller to
rely on a long standing interpretation as evidence of a rule's correctness
when it is in their advantage to do so, the court's response on this point is
significant. In addressing the comptroller's assertion that her longstand-
ing administrative interpretation of the rule should stand, the court ob-
served "these rulings do not bind us to accept an erroneous interpretation
simply because it is longstanding."1 4 Although clearly correct, the court's
observation will not preclude parties from continuing to cite the long-
standing nature length of an interpretation as a reason to adopt that in-
terpretation. More significantly, the debate will continue about the
circumstances in which the comptroller can adopt a different interpreta-
tion of law, without a triggering legislative or judicial change, and then
collect additional taxes from taxpayers who had followed the prior, long-
standing comptroller interpretation. As the Entertainment Publications
decision shows, the comptroller's ability to change her mind is limited,
and significant policy changes may require the comptroller to comply
with official rule-making procedural requirements.' 5
Like Zimmer, Combs v. Chapal Zenray, Inc. involves the taxability of
items purchased from out-of-state sellers.16 The taxpayer purchased
materials, including self-adhesive labels and jewelry boxes, from out-of-
state sellers and then attached the materials in Texas to jewelry that
would be sold outside the state.17 After the retailers sold the jewelry to
their own customers, those customers would presumably detach the la-
bels and tags, and wear the jewelry.' 8 The question before the court was
10. Id. at 584.
11. Id. at 585. See also Combs v. Entm't Publ'ns, Inc., 292 S.W.3d 712, 723 (Tex.
App.-Austin 2009, no pet.) (confirming that comptroller may not bypass the require-
ments for amending administrative rules).
12. Zimmer US, Inc., 368 S.W.2d at 587.
13. Id. at 586.
14. Id. at 587.
15. Entm't Publ'ns, 292 S.W.3d at 723-24.






whether Chapal was making a taxable use of the materials in Texas.19 The
trial court ruled in the taxpayer's favor, holding that Chapal's use of the
materials while in Texas did not constitute a taxable use under Tax Code
§ 151.011.20 The comptroller prevailed on appeal, convincing the court
that Chapal's "attaching" the materials to jewelry was not the kind of
"attaching" the legislature had envisioned when it excluded from the def-
inition of taxable use the act of "attaching the property to or incorporat-
ing the property into other property to be transported outside the state
for use solely outside the state." 21
The case appropriately turned on statutory construction and, in partic-
ular, on the scope of the Texas use tax. Chapal reasonably argued that,
under § 151.011(f)(2), attachment of the materials to the jewelry prior to
transporting the combined product out of state did not constitute a taxa-
ble use of the materials. 22 According to the comptroller, however,
Chapel's definition of the term "attaching" was inconsistent with the
other terms used in § 151.011(f)(2)-processing, fabricating, manufactur-
ing, and incorporating-all of which, in the comptroller's view, "connote
a relatively permanent joining of components." 23
The court looked at (and beyond) the ordinary meaning of the word
"attach" and concluded that the comptroller's argument, which requires
that the attachment of the materials "result in a finished product that has
functionality, aesthetic appeal, or usefulness to the ultimate consumer
throughout the product's useful life, is not unreasonable and does not
contradict the plain language of the statute." 24 The court's discussion
could be read to suggest that a comptroller interpretation should be up-
held if it is both reasonable and consistent with the statute; however, such
a reading would ignore other restrictions placed on the comptroller, in-
cluding those described in Entertainment Publications.25 Given the past
extensive judicial and legislative attention to what constitutes a taxable
use, taxpayers can expect the debate over this issue-and over the weight
accorded to comptroller interpretations-to continue. 26
19. Id. at 757.
20. Id. at 755; TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.011(f) (West 2008) (providing that "use" in
Texas does not include "the exercise of a right or power over or the keeping or retaining of
tangible personal property for the purpose of: (1) transporting the property outside the
state for use solely outside the state; or (2) processing, fabricating, or manufacturing the
property into other property or attaching the property to or incorporating the property
into other property to be transported outside the state for use solely outside the state")
(emphasis added).
21. Chapal Zenray, Inc., 357 S.W.3d. at 760; TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.011(f).
22. Chapal Zenray, Inc., 357 S.W.3d at 754.
23. Id. at 758. See infra note 50 and accompanying text regarding the meaning of
processing, fabricating and manufacturing in the context of the manufacturing exemption
for these activities.
24. Chapel Zenray, Inc., 357 S.W.3d at 759.
25. See generally, Combs v. Entm't Publ'ns, Inc., 292 S.W.3d 712, 723 (Tex. App.-
Austin 2009, no pet.).
26. See, e.g., Sharp v. Morton Bldgs., Inc., 953 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997,
pet. denied) (holding that raw materials purchased out of state, incorporated into other
products out of state, and then subsequently brought into Texas were not used in the state
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Sales tax issues relating to computer services, software and cloud com-
puting provide ample fodder for disputes as both taxpayers and comptrol-
ler staff search for appropriate ways to draw lines between taxable and
nontaxable items. Rapidly changing technology (and changing comptrol-
ler policies) intensified these disputes during the Survey period. On the
legislative side, the 2011 legislative session added § 151.108 to the Tax
Code to define "Internet hosting" and to confirm that using Internet
hosting in the state does not constitute doing business in the state.27
Verizon Business Network Services, Inc. v. Combs, for example, ad-
dresses sales and use taxes in the context of software and related ser-
vices.28 For Texas sales tax purposes, software is treated as tangible
personal property, so software maintenance provided in Texas is often
taxable in Texas.29 However, the taxing jurisdiction in which maintenance
of custom software is taxable is generally dependent, for Texas sales tax
purposes, on the location at which the benefit of the service occurs.30 Ver-
izon argued in the court of appeals: (1) that when it purchased the ser-
vices at issue, the object of the transaction was modifying Verizon's
existing custom software; (2) that the benefit of that service was Washing-
ton D.C.; and (3) that Texas sales or use tax is due only on copies of the
software used in Texas.31 The comptroller, by contrast, viewed Verizon as
having purchased new software-tangible personal property-for use in
Texas. 32 Specifically, the comptroller argued that Verizon's enhancements
should be treated as a sale of tangible personal property, and not as main-
tenance to the existing software.33 The court of appeals agreed with the
comptroller, dismissing all of Verizon's arguments. The court concluded
that the software Verizon purchased, which added new features and effi-
ciencies to Verizon's current software, was tangible personal property,
and not services to existing software. In doing so, the court distinguished
between changes to software that merely maintain a software operating
system's original capacity, which would be a computer maintenance ser-
and were therefore nontaxable); but see TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.011(a) (West 2008)
(as amended in 2003).
27. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.108 (West Supp. 2012).
28. Verizon Bus. Network Servs., Inc. v. Combs, No. 07-11-00025-CV (353rd Dist. Ct.,
Travis County, Tex. Oct. 29, 2010) affd, No. 07-11-0025, 2013 WL 1343530 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo Apr. 3, 2013, pet. filed) (mem. op.); see Cynthia M. Ohlenforst et al., Taxation, 63
SMU L. REv. 821, 824 (2010) (discussing Verizon Bus. Network Servs., Inc., No. 07-11-
00025-CV).
29. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.009 (West 2008).
30. The comptroller repealed the administrative rule setting forth the criteria for de-
termining whether software is "custom" in 1987; comptroller policy as to whether to con-
tinue to apply the criteria from the rule appears inconsistent. See Tex. Comptroller Pub.
Accounts, Hearing No. 44,668 (Nov. 19, 2004).
31. Verizon Bus. Network Servs., Inc. v. Combs, No. 07-11-0025, 2013 WL 1343530, at
*3 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Apr. 3, 2013, pet. filed) (mem. op.).
32. Id.
33. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.308(b)(3) (2012) (Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts,




vice, and changes to software that add new functionality. 34 The court
looked to the essence of the transaction to find that Verizon had con-
tracted for the sale of tangible personal property, a master program that
Verizon kept in Texas to use for troubleshooting, and not for the sale of
computer engineering services attendant or incidental to the program.35
Furthermore, the court found that the sale took place in Texas because
Verizon took possession of the software in Texas and paid the lump sum
contract for the software before copies of the program were made and
installed outside of Texas.36 Even if the sale had not occurred in Texas,
the court concluded in the alternative that the software would be subject
to Texas use tax because the software was tested and remained in Texas.37
Key to this case, as well as to multiple pending audits and administra-
tive hearings, is determining whether improvements or enhancements to
a computer program constitute the service of maintaining software or the
sale of a new computer program. As the parties' positions in Verizon
demonstrate, the line between modifying an existing program and creat-
ing a new one is sometimes far from clear. Moreover, the line seems to
waver as the comptroller's current view of what constitutes software
maintenance appears narrower than the comptroller's earlier views. Re-
gardless of whether the shift in the comptroller's view is based on chang-
ing technology or on revenue concerns, the task of distinguishing taxable
sales from nontaxable sales in this context can be difficult.38
Combs v. Health Care Services Corp. addresses another frequently con-
tested issue: the applicability of the sale-for-resale exemption in the con-
text of a federal contract.39 Health Care Services Corporation (HCSC), as
successor to Blue Cross Blue Shield of Texas, prevailed before the district
court on its claim for exemption for items purchased for resale to the
federal government. 40 HCSC had entered into a cost-plus contract to pro-
vide nontaxable, health care management services to the government.
The contract included a title-shifting provision (common in federal gov-
ernment contracts) that transferred title of purchased items to the gov-
34. Verizon Bus. Network Servs., 2013 WL 1343530, at *7-8.
35. Id. at *8-9.
36. Id. at *7.
37. Id.
38. See also Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts, Hearing No. 44,127 (July 8, 2005) (con-
firming that maintenance services for custom software are taxed based on multi-state bene-
fit location pursuant to TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.330(f) (West 2008) and 34 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 3.330 (West 2012) (Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts, Data Processing
Servs.)); TAX POLICY NEWS, WINDOW ON STATE GOVERNMENT (July 2012) http://window
.state.tx.us/taxinfo/taxpnw/tpn20l2/tpnl2O7.html#issue4 (last visited Aug. 31, 2013) discuss-
ing the § 151.330 multistate benefit exemption for certain services-including repair and
maintenance of custom computer programs-that benefit an identifiable segment of a busi-
ness; this discussion is noteworthy in part because it suggests a definition for "identifiable
segment" that is arguably inconsistent with existing law).
39. Combs v. Health Care Servs. Corp., No. 03-09-00617-CV, 2011 WL 1005419, at *1
(Tex. App.-Austin Mar. 16, 2011), (mem. op.) affd in part, rev'd in part, 401 S.W.3d 623
(Tex. 2013), (often referred to as the Blue Cross Blue Shield case); see Ohlenforst, supra
note 28, at 63 SMU L. REv. 821, 823-24.
40. Health Care Servs. Corp., 2011 WL 1005419, at *1.
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ernment customer. The district court agreed that not only the tangible
personal property, but also the leases, licenses, products, and taxable ser-
vices purchased by HCSC qualified for the exemption. 41
The comptroller appealed unsuccessfully, asserting that there was no
evidence either to show that taxable items were resold to the federal gov-
ernment or to support the district court's determination that HCSC did
not double-recover by receiving both a sales tax refund and reimburse-
ments of sales tax payments from the federal government.42
Relying on the plain meaning of the controlling statutes, the Texas Su-
preme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision, except with regard
to HCSC's leases of certain property.43 In affirming the court of appeals
and rejecting the comptroller's attempt to interpret the resale exemption
statutes beyond the plain meaning of their language, he supreme court
stated that it "read[s] unambiguous statutes as they are written, not as
they make the most policy sense. If a statute is worded clearly, we must
honor its plain language."44 The Court also refused deference to the
comptroller's interpretation, stating that "a precondition to agency defer-
ence is ambiguity; 'an agency's opinion cannot change the language.'
There is no ambiguity about the ambiguity requirement." 4 5 The supreme
court reversed the court of appeals with regard only to the resale exemp-
tion for leases of tangible personal property. Although the leased prop-
erty was eventually transferred to the government when HCSC's original
purpose in leasing the property was to re-lease it.4 6
While HCSC was pursuing its tax contest, the Texas legislature revised
the resale exemption, apparently intending to limit the availability of the
deduction in the context of certain government contracts, at least for peri-
ods after the effective date of the amendment. New subsection 151.006(c)
provides that a sale for resale does not include the sale of tangible per-
sonal property or a service to a purchaser who acquires it to perform "a
service that is not taxed under this chapter," unless it is purchased to
resell to the United States in a contract that meets the description of
§ 151.006(c). 47 This subsection, and other amendments to § 151.006,
could create confusion about whether the statute requires that, in order
to be validly resold, an item must have already had tax imposed on it-as
opposed to requiring only that, in order to be validly resold, an item must
41. Id. at *3.
42. Id. at *3, *15.
43. Combs v. Health Care Servs. Corp., 401 S.W.3d 623, 625 (Tex. 2013).
44. Id. at 629.
45. Id. at 630 (citation omitted).
46. Id. at 632. See also TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.006(a)(1) (West Supp. 2012) (de-
fining "sale for resale" as the sale of tangible personal property or a taxable service to a
purchaser who acquires the property or service for the purpose of reselling it" (emphasis
added)).
47. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.006(c) (West Supp. 2012). Nontaxable services should
be contrasted with "taxable services" as defined in TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0101 (West
2008); that category of services (i.e., nontaxable services) is not coextensive with services to
which tax does not apply for some other reason (e.g., because the sale is out of state or
because an exemption applies).
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be generally taxable under the code. In any event, the revised statute is
likely to generate additional litigation rather than stem the tide.
Southwest Royalties v. Combs, one of the year's most talked-about re-
fund cases, focuses on sales tax paid in connection with equipment used
in oil and gas exploration and production. 48 Southwest Royalties (SWR),
a producer and processor of oil and natural gas, purchased items related
to its oil and gas production and processing operations-various above-
ground equipment, such as piping, valves, fittings, flanges, and below-
ground equipment such as pumps, couplings, motors, and separators.
SWR contends that the equipment is used or consumed in or during the
actual processing of tangible personal property for ultimate sale, is neces-
sary or essential to such processing, and qualifies for the exemption set
forth in § 151.318 of the Tax Code. 49 This exemption is often referred to
as the "manufacturing exemption." That term, though, is a shorthand ref-
erence to an exemption that, by its statutory terms, applies to tangible
personal property directly used or consumed during actual manufactur-
ing, fabricating, or processing, if the property directly makes or causes a
chemical or physical change to the product.50 SWR points out that the
equipment at issue was used in or during the actual "processing" of a
product to extract and separate the mixture into its components of oil,
gas, and water; that the equipment is necessary and essential to that pro-
cess; and that the equipment is therefore exempt.
Although multiple comptroller hearings confirm that the manufactur-
ing exemption applies to oil and gas equipment, the comptroller has re-
cently changed her position and now asserts that items used in the
exploration and production of minerals are not eligible for the exemp-
tion.51 The comptroller cites a recent district court order as support for
her current position, but the pending SWR case may well be more impor-
tant to the ultimate resolution of the issue.52
Judge Dietz originally ruled from the bench for SWR, concluding that
the oil and gas production equipment at issue is eligible for Texas's sales
48. Southwest Royalties v. Combs, No. D-1-GN-09-004284, 1 (353rd Dist. Ct., Travis
County, Tex. Apr. 30, 2012) (oral argument to the Third District Court of Appeals oc-
curred on Sept. 25, 2013).
49. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.318(a)(2) (West 2008).
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts Hearing No. 23,055 (August 17, 1988)
(stating, "[i]f the Tax Division wishes to remove all mining activities from manufacturing,
processing, and fabrication, a duly promulgated rule should be proposed."). Even this tax-
payer-favorable decision is too favorable to the comptroller given its underlying assump-
tion that a rule, as opposed to a statutory change, could exclude mining activities from an
exemption that, by its terms, encompasses not all of manufacturing, fabrication, and
processing. See id.
52. See Leoncito Plant, L.L.C. v. Combs, No. D-1-GN-11-001116 (126th Dist. Ct.,
Travis County, Tex. May 23, 2012) (granting partial summary judgment for comptroller
when taxpayer had sought a refund of tax paid on purchases of equipment for use in its
uranium mining operation, including well casings and other equipment, arguing that it
qualifies as a manufacturer, including because it performs processing that occurs prior the
extraction of minerals and because neither the statute nor the comptroller rule excludes
mineral extraction from the definition of manufacturing).
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tax exemption for property used in manufacturing. However, three weeks
later, after a rehearing, the judge's decision effectively reversed the bench
ruling by concluding that the physical or chemical changes to extracted
minerals are naturally occurring changes incident to the minerals' move-
ment to the surface, and that the equipment was "merely an indirect
cause of the changes."53
The post-rehearing decision recognizes that a physical change occurs
when petroleum is brought to the surface, that the "changes from liquid
to gas and gas to liquid are 'physical changes' within the meaning of the
statute," and "that the physical changes are caused by differences in pres-
sure and temperature that result from lifting the petroleum to the sur-
face.54 However, the court found (somewhat confusingly) that although
"the evidence established that the direct cause of the physical change is
the change in pressure and/or temperature," the taxpayer had failed to
establish that the equipment at issue directly causes the physical change
to the petroleum.55
The original bench decision triggered substantial commentary about its
possible fiscal impact and debate about the appropriateness of the comp-
troller's argument that the fiscal impact of a comptroller loss could be
significant.
In Austin Engineering v. Combs, the taxpayer claimed its erosion con-
trol measures were either nontaxable or exempt. 56 Austin Engineering
provides construction services to businesses and governmental entities
and specializes in "utility and environmental construction of underground
utilities, drainage improvements, roads and highways, airports, pump sta-
tions, water and wastewater treatment plants, and storm water filtration
facilities."57 Austin Engineering argued that even if the transactions at
issue were considered taxable as the sale or rental of tangible personal
property, the transactions would qualify for exemption. The court of ap-
peals concluded "that the essence of the transactions was the sale or
rental of tangible personal property in the form of silt fences, tri-dikes,
and inlet protectors, rather than the provision of an erosion control ser-
vice"; therefore, the court held that transactions are subject to sales tax.58
The court also concluded that with respect to certain improvements of
government-owned real property, the § 151.311 exemption does not ap-
ply because the exemption requires tangible personal property to be in-
corporated into real property, and the erosion control devices were not so
incorporated.59 The court also denied the taxpayer's claim for an exemp-
tion under § 151.355 because the court determined there was no evidence
53. Southwest Royalties, No. D-1-GN-009-004284, at 3.
54. Id. at 2.
55. Id. at 3.
56. Austin Eng'g Co. v. Combs, No. 03-10-00323-CV, 2011 WL 3371557, at *2 (Tex.
App.-Austin Aug. 5, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.).
57. Id. at *1.
58. Id. at *4; TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.355 (West 2008).
59. Austin Eng'g Co., 2011 WL 3371557, at *4-5.
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to show that the erosion control measures were "used solely to construct
or operate" water system projects.60 The court also denied the taxpayer's
sale-for-resale claim under § 151.302.61
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of Austin Engi-
neering's motion for summary judgment but, as to whether the provision
of erosion control devices is subject to the exemption for consumable
supplies, reversed the trial court's summary judgment order in favor of
the comptroller and, based on a remaining fact issue, remanded for fur-
ther proceedings. 62
The comptroller adopted proposed amendments to Rule 3.346 concern-
ing use tax to modify provisions regarding direct-payment permit holders
and local tax allocations.63 According to the comptroller, amendments to
the rule were necessary to be consistent with the Tax Code.64 The
adopted rule modifies provisions regarding the local tax responsibilities
of direct-payment permit holders and other persons who purchase items
out of state that are stored in the state, when it is unknown at the time if
the items will be used in Texas or out of state.65 It is also worth noting,
including because of attendant, major publicity, that Amazon.com, Inc.
(Amazon) began collecting and paying Texas sales tax on July 1, 2012
under a joint settlement agreement with the state.66 Amazon and the
comptroller had long been at odds over whether the retailer legally had
sufficient physical presence in the state-by virtue of an affiliate's Dallas-
area distribution center-to subject Amazon to Texas sales tax law. 67 The
comptroller had assessed Amazon with $269 million in back taxes based
in part on the comptroller's view that Amazon's separate entities could
create nexus for one another.68
During the 2011 legislative session, the governor vetoed a stand-alone
bill that would have codified the comptroller's positions in the Amazon
disagreement. 69 Among other significant changes, House Bill 2403 would
have provided that an out-of-state retailer is engaged in business in Texas
if it has an ownership interest in, or is owned by, an entity that maintains
a location in the state, provided that the retailer either sells the same
kinds of products as the in-state entity or the in-state facility is used to
60. Id. at *7-8.
61. Id. at *8; ( reasoning that Austin Engineering was not the party required to collect
the tax, but holding that a subcontractor could attempt to claim this exemption); (citing
Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 151.302 (West 5008)).
62. Austin Eng'g Co., 2011 WL 3371557, at *7.
63. 37 Tex. Reg. 8857 (2012) (adopting 37 Tex Reg. 3677 (2012)) (to be codified as an
amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.346).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Press Release, Susan Combs, Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, Texas, Ama-
zon Announce Agreement to Create Jobs (Apr. 27, 2012), http://www.window.state.tx.us/
news2012/120427-Amazon.html.
67. See generally id.
68. See generally id.
69. Veto Message of Gov. Perry, Tex. H.B. 2403, 82d Leg. R.S. (2011).
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promote or perform other tasks on behalf of the out-of-state entity.70
However, the governor's veto did not have its desired effect for very long:
because the amendments contained in House Bill 2403 made their way
into the general appropriations bill, and Governor Perry signed that
bill-and its changes to the state's nexus laws-into effect.71
II. FRANCHISE TAX: POLICY VERSUS REVENUE?
VALIDITY OF TAX, CALCULATIONS, COMPTROLLER
INTERPRETATION, LEGISLATION
Beginning in 2011, the Texas Supreme Court heard the first constitu-
tional challenge to the state's margin-based franchise tax.7 2 It is helpful to
keep in mind the backdrop against which the comptroller and taxpayers
have entered into these disputes: the revised franchise tax had not been
the cash cow legislators expected and, because the initial franchise tax
shortfalls coincided with the economic downturn, the state had been
looking for other sources of revenue, including by pursuing increasingly
aggressive positions in the franchise tax context.73 While the substance of
the challenges to the tax has varied, some of the most interesting and
instructive lessons from the cases involve the supreme court's justified
reluctance to take on a full docket of cases featuring complicated, techni-
cal questions with statutorily-prescribed ruling deadlines.
Legislation enacted in 2006 to replace the old earned surplus/taxable
capital version of the tax, which generally became effective in 2008, im-
posed the franchise tax, for the first time, on limited partnerships,74 in-
cluding Allcat Claims Service, L.P. (Allcat), the plaintiff in In re Allcat
Claims Service, L.P. and John Weakly, Relators.75 Many legislators
viewed the 2006 statutory revisions to the franchise tax as closing a long-
standing, though perfectly legal, loophole through which limited partner-
ships (among other entities) had not been subject to the tax for years.
However, Allcat, a Texas limited partnership, challenged the tax based on
the Bullock Amendment to the Texas Constitution, which prohibits impo-
sition of a tax on the "net income of natural persons" without prior voter
approval.76
Allcat claimed it was entitled to a refund of franchise tax paid under
protest with respect to each of its partner's allocated shares of partner-
70. Tex. H.B. 2403 § 2, 82d Leg., R.S. (2011).
71. Tex. S.B. 1 Art. 30, 82d Leg., 1st C.S. (2011).
72. See generally, In re Allcat Claim Serv., L.P., 356 S.W.3d 455 (Tex. 2011).
73. Although wholesale reform of the franchise tax in 2013 was not expected, the push
for legislative tinkering on several franchise tax fronts yielded several substantive changes.
The 2009 legislative session extended the $1 million no-tax-due threshold through Decem-
ber 31, 2013. With the Consumer Price Index adjustment required by § 171.006(b) of the
Texas Tax Code, the no-tax-due threshold is $1,030,000 for reports originally due on or
after January 1, 2012, and before January 1, 2014. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.06(b) (West
2000).
74. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 171.0002 (West Supp. 2012), 171.001 (West 2008).
75. In re Allcat Claims Serv., 356 S.W.3d at 455.
76. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 24.
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ship income. Allcat reasoned that the tax indirectly reached its partners'
net incomes and that, because the tax had not been approved by voters,
the tax violated the Bullock Amendment and was therefore
unconstitutional.77
Allcat filed two alternate suits to claim a refund of its tax payments:
one in Travis County District Court, and another directly with the Texas
Supreme Court.78 Allcat relied on a provision in the new franchise tax
that vests in the supreme court "original jurisdiction over a challenge to
the constitutionality of [the new franchise tax] Act or any part of [the]
Act."79
The supreme court carefully considered its jurisdictional authority
under the revised franchise tax act and concluded that, at least on the
Bullock Amendment issue, it did have authority to consider the argu-
ments.80 However, rather than determine whether the franchise tax was
effectively an income tax with respect to the natural-person partners of
taxable partnerships, as many tax practitioners and taxpayers had hoped
the court might, the court instead focused primarily on examining the
statutory and jurisprudential separation between partnerships and their
partners.81 The court concluded that partnerships and their partners
should be considered separate entities and, as a result, the taxation of a
partnership's margin under the revised tax did not amount to the taxation
of the partners' net incomes, even to the extent the franchise tax reached
partnership income that had been allocated to the partners. 82
In addition to Allcat's facial challenge to the tax's constitutionality
under the Bullock Amendment, Allcat also raised an as-applied challenge
to the tax under the Texas constitutional requirement that taxes be im-
posed equally and uniformly.83 However, the supreme court determined
that the Franchise Tax Act's grant of original jurisdiction for purposes of
considering the constitutionality of the tax did not extend to as-applied
challenges, and it declined to consider that portion of Allcat's suit.84 The
court also dismissed Allcat's claim for attorneys' fees based on a lack of
jurisdiction to hear the claim.85
Two related cases, In re Nestle USA, Inc., Switchplace, LLC, and
NSBMA, LP, Relators8 6 and In re Nestle USA, Inc., Relator,87 join Allcat
among the first set of cases to test the constitutional muster of the new
Texas franchise tax. Nestle USA, Inc. (Nestle) brought original petitions
before the Texas Supreme Court seeking: (1) a declaration that the re-
77. In re Allcat Claims Serv., L.P., 356 S.W.3d at 457.
78. Id. at 459.
79. Id. at 460.
80. Id. at 460-63.
81. Id. at 463-65.
82. Id. at 468-70.
83. Id. at 479.
84. Id. at 471.
85. Id. at 472.
86. In re Nestle USA, Inc., 359 S.W.3d 207, 208 (Tex. 2012).
87. In re Nestle USA, Inc., 387 S.W.3d 610, 611-12 (Tex. 2012).
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vised, margin-based franchise tax is unconstitutional; (2) an injunction
prohibiting the comptroller from collecting the tax; and (3) a mandamus
ordering the comptroller to refund franchise taxes.88 In its first attempt to
secure a judicial decision on the merits, Nestle sued for a refund of taxes
paid with respect to tax years 2008 through 2011.89 Nestle cited a provi-
sion in the revised franchise tax, which gives the supreme court original
jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges to the tax, as authority for
bringing the suit before that court without first proceeding through the
typical administrative and judicial procedures required for other taxpayer
suits.90 Nestle did not pay the taxes under protest, so Nestle did not rely
on either a comptroller denial of a refund claim or on a protest payment
to establish its basis for suit.91
Instead of focusing on the merits of Nestle's constitutionality claims
and requests for declaratory and injunctive relief, the court examined the
legislature's grant of original jurisdiction for constitutional claims to the
court and determined that the grant was only a narrow exception to the
regular jurisdictional requirements for taxpayer suits-not, as Nestle
urged, an alternate jurisdictional path. 92 The court noted that allowing
taxpayers to bring original petitions before the state's supreme court
without first exhausting available administrative remedies as required by
Tax Code Chapter 112 would disrupt the state's tax collection scheme and
deprive-possibly for years-the comptroller of notice of any alleged ille-
galities in the imposition or collection regimes.93 Many practitioners be-
lieve the court may also be reticent to jump into the middle of
complicated tax analyses on the accelerated timetable required by the
legislature's grant to the court of original jurisdiction over certain consti-
tutional challenges to the tax.
Nestle paid under protest the asserted tax liability with respect to the
2012 tax year and again filed an original petition with the Texas Supreme
Court to address the same substantive claims at issue in its prior chal-
lenge.94 Central to Nestle's complaint was its assertion that the franchise
tax violates both the Texas Constitution's Equal and Uniform Clause, and
the U.S. Constitution's Equal Protection and Due Process rights as ar-
ticulated in the Fourteenth Amendment. Nestle argued that its manufac-
turing activities outside Texas should not subject Nestle, whose Texas
activities are limited to retail and wholesale trade, to the general 1.0%
rate applicable to most Texas franchise taxpayers.95 Rather, Nestle ar-
88. In re Nestle USA, Inc., 359 S.W.3d at 208.
89. Id. at 207.
90. Id. at 209-10.
91. Id. at 209.
92. Id. at 210. The court noted further that it had not explored the Chapter 112 juris-
dictional requirements as it had in the Alicat case because Allcat had complied with all
such requirements and had filed concurrent suits both at the district court level and at the
Supreme court. Id.
93. Id. at 211.




gued that it should be subject to the favorable 0.5% rate applicable to
certain retailers and wholesalers. 96 Nestle also argued that the compara-
bly higher rate imposed on taxpayers with manufacturing businesses
outside the state violates the interstate commerce protections under the
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.97
After reviewing the origins of and numerous changes to the franchise
tax, including a review of various taxpayer classifications that the tax has
long included, the court concluded that "the Legislature's structuring of
the franchise tax is reasonably related to its object," 98 and that the tax
does not violate the Equal and Uniform Clause of the Texas Constitution
because, in part, "for nonproperty taxes, the uniformity which is required
has always been stated as being a uniformity within classes." 99 Nestle had
already conceded that the outcome of its Equal and Uniform challenge
would control the fate of its Equal Protection challenge under the U.S.
Constitution, so the Court ruled against Nestle on that challenge as
well. 100
As for Nestle's assertion that the 1.0% rate discriminated against cer-
tain retailers and wholesalers engaged in interstate commerce, the court
held that differing tax rates are permissible if the differences are based on
the activities of the taxpayers rather than on their locations. 01
While Texas courts produced more than their fair share of interesting
tax cases during the Survey period, California produced one of the most
significant franchise tax apportionment cases in recent memory. Its possi-
ble impact on Texas merits discussion.
While many states rely on single-sales-factor calculations or on a three-
factor calculation (property, payroll, and sales), variations exist both
within these formulas and outside of them. The Gillette case addresses
questions about whether and the extent to which Multistate Tax Compact
(MTC) member states may elect to use apportionment formulas that dif-
fer from the Compact's prescribed three-factor formula.102 These ques-
tions-and their answers-threaten to undermine the continuing viability
of the MTC.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 616-17.
98. Id. at 621-24.
99. Id. at 620-21.
100. Id. at 624. The court also cited Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U.S. 331,
333-34 (1939), for the proposition that "the franchise tax d[oes] not violate due process
because in 'a unitary enterprise, property outside the state, when correlated in use with
property within the state, necessarily affects the worth of the privilege within the state."' In
re Nestle USA, Inc., 387 S.W.3d.
101. In re Nestle USA, Inc., 387 S.W.3d at 625. (noting that taxes need not precisely
align with the values provided by states because the franchise tax was, in effect, closely
related enough to the services provided by Texas to justify the differing rates for different
classes of taxpayers).
102. Gillette Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 603, 606-07 (Cal. Ct. App.
2012) review granted and opinion superseded sub nom. Gillette v. Franchise Tax Bd., 291
P.3d 327 (Cal. 2013).
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In Gillette, taxpayers claimed a refund for taxes paid under California's
apportionment formula, which considers the same three factors as the
MTC, of which California had been a member during all times at issue in
the case, but double-weights the sales factor. 103 The taxpayers' challenge
centers on the state's denial of their election to use the standard three-
factor formula provided for in the MTC. As the taxpayers pointed out-
and the court agreed-the equally-weighted, three-factor apportionment
formula "is one of the Compact's key mandatory provisions designed to
secure a baseline level of uniformity in state income tax systems, a central
purpose of the agreement." 10 California had amended its apportionment
formula provision in 1993, but the court held that the state could not uni-
laterally alter or amend terms of the MTC after having entered into it.105
Rather, if the state wished to require a different apportionment calcula-
tion for multistate taxpayers, the legislature's only course of action-at
least with respect to superseding that specific, mandatory apportionment
provision of the MTC-would have been to repeal and withdraw from
the MTC altogether.106
In a move that was not entirely surprising but that nevertheless sent
shockwaves through the state and local tax world, California did just that:
only a few weeks after the court's initial decision in the Gillette case, Cali-
fornia withdrew from the MTC, choosing to retain its franchise tax appor-
tionment and other California-specific provisions rather than adhere to
the uniformity provisions that its membership in the MTC required under
the court's decision. California's repeal of the MTC is significant not only
to California, but also to other MTC states, including Texas. 107
Many of the most hotly contested Texas franchise tax cases decided
during the Survey period involved the applicability and the calculation of
the cost of goods sold ("COGS") deduction. These cases illustrate not
only the complexity of the COGS deduction but also bring to light many
lingering questions about the proper calculation of the tax. These cases
are of particular note in light of the comptroller's agreement to allow
taxpayers to amend franchise tax returns to change between cost of goods
sold and compensation deductions.108
Taylor & Hill, Inc. v. Combs was a trigger for addressing this issue. The
case involved a taxpayer's attempt to claim a compensation deduction
103. Id. at 607, 610.
104. Id. at 606.
105. Id. at 610, 616.
106. Id. at 616-17.
107. In a case that seems destined to explore the limits of the Gillette opinion's analysis
outside of California, Graphic Packaging Corp. v. Combs, No. D-1-GN-12-003038 (3rd
Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. filed Sept. 27, 2012), addresses whether the taxpayer had a
right to file its 2010 margin tax report and refund claims for 2008 and 2009 using the evenly
weighted three-factor apportionment formula in the MTC.




even though it had previously claimed the COGS deduction.109 The
comptroller had argued that the taxpayer was not entitled to a COGS
deduction for its engineers' wages and benefits, and that the company
could not amend its tax report to claim a deduction for compensation.
However, the court concluded that the taxpayer is a temporary employ-
ment services company and is entitled to claim the compensation deduc-
tion to compute taxable margin.110
A number of taxpayers have also challenged the comptroller's interpre-
tation of statutory inclusions and exclusions, including with respect to cer-
tain flow-through funds, in the context of calculating total revenue. Titan
Transportation, L.P. v. Combs, for example, involves a taxpayer's claim
that it should be allowed to deduct from total revenue amounts it paid to
independent subcontractors for hauling work done in connection with im-
provements to real property. 1 ' The court ruled in the comptroller's favor
on the issue of whether the taxpayer was entitled to a COGS deduction
pursuant to § 171.1011(g)(3), although the judge denied the comptroller's
request to require a 100% apportionment factor instead of the 20.18%
that the comptroller had previously agreed to accept.112
Titan, like many contractors, subcontracts with independent contrac-
tors. Titan agrees to pay its subcontractor owner/operators a portion of
the revenues that Titan receives from its customers. Titan claimed that
the amounts it pays over to its subcontractors are "flow-through funds
that are mandated by contract to be distributed to other entities," includ-
ing "subcontracting payments handled by the taxable entity to provide
services, labor, or materials," in connection with improvements to real
property, and, therefore, that the amounts qualify for exclusion from total
revenue under Tax Code § 171.1011(g)(3).11 3
Titan argues in the alternative that, if it is not permitted to exclude
subcontract amounts from total revenue, it should be permitted to in-
clude them in its COGS deduction, claiming that it furnishes "labor or
materials to a project for the construction, improvement, remodeling, re-
pair or industrial maintenance . . . of real property," and is therefore the
owner of such labor and should be permitted to deduct the labor costs as
part of its COGS deduction.114
In a number of contexts, the comptroller seems to have attempted to
fill a perceived gap where no new legislation has been enacted by an-
nouncing changes in policy and working to amend rules. One change in-
volves the comptroller's recent announcement that she now agrees that
taxpayers may change their election, or may make an initial election, to
109. Taylor & Hill, Inc. v. Combs, No. D-1-GN-10-004429 (53rd Dist. Ct., Travis
County, Tex. July 7, 2011).
110. Id.
111. Titan Transp., L.P. v. Combs, No. D-1-GN-11-002866 (353rd Dist. Ct., Travis
County, Tex., filed Sept. 15, 2011).
112. Id.
113. Id.; TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1011(g)(3) (West Supp. 2012).
114. Titan Transp., L.P., No. D-1-GN-11-002866.
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use the COGS or the compensation deduction by amending their
franchise tax reports."15 Since the new policy took effect, several comp-
troller hearings that had denied taxpayers' attempts to change their elec-
tions after the due date, have been partially superseded.116 The
comptroller has indicated that she intends to amend the Reports and Pay-
ments rule to reflect the new policy, though she has not yet proposed an
amendment of that rule.117
The comptroller did recently amend the Total Revenue rule to codify
her view that, to be considered flow-through funds, taxes collected by a
taxable entity must be imposed on a third party and remitted by the taxa-
ble entity.118 The apparent purpose of the comptroller's amendment was
to make clear her position that taxes actually imposed on a taxable entity
may not qualify as flow-through funds and may not be excluded from
total revenue.119
Among the most widely discussed of the comptroller's recent actions
was the amendment to the Cost of Goods Sold rule.120 Beginning a few
years ago-in a series of public statements by various comptroller repre-
sentatives in panel discussions and other presentations-the comptroller
has taken the position that only the labor costs attributable to people who
physically work on a good may be included in a taxable entity's cost of
goods sold deduction.121 The clear implication of these statements is that
the comptroller's then-view-with which many tax practitioners strongly
disagreed-was that supervisory labor is not allowable as part of a taxa-
ble entity's COGS deduction.
Though the comptroller issued a proposed draft amendment of the
Cost of Goods Sold rule to codify this position, a series of discussions
with and comments from the state bar and taxpayer advocacy groups
have successfully tempered the position that was ultimately adopted. Key
to the final, adopted revisions to the COGS rule is the comptroller's shift
toward adoption of certain categories of costs and taxpayers may capital-
ize under analogous Internal Revenue Code provisions, including section
263A. The final, amended rule provides that taxpayers may include in
their COGS deductions "all 'direct labor costs; all indirect labor costs,
other than service costs, that are capitalized under IRC § 263A; and ser-
115. See Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accts. 201206444L (June 20, 2012) for a statement of
the new policy.
116. See, e.g., Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accts. Hearing Nos. 104,062; 105,037; and
105,876 (partially superseded Aug. 1, 2012).
117. See 34 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 3.584 (2013) (Tex Comptroller of Pub. Accounts,
Margin: Reports and Payments).
118. 37 Tex. Reg. 1675 (2012), adopted 37 Tex. Reg. 7487 (2012) (codified at 34 TEx.
ADMIN. CODE § 3.587 (2013) (Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, margin: Total
Revenue)).
119. See id.
120. See 34 Tex. Admin. Code § 3.588 (2013) (Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Mar-
gin: Cost of Goods Sold).
121. See id. Section 171.1012(c) of the tax code allows, as a cost of goods sold, direct
costs of acquiring or producing goods and contains no such "work directly on goods" limi-
tation on deductible labor. See Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 171.1012(c) (West 2008).
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vice costs that are allocable to the acquisition or production of good, sub-
ject to a four percent cap."122
III. PROPERTY TAX: CONTINUING CONFUSION
OWNERSHIP AND STANDING, LEGISLATION
Though appraisal districts and taxpayers have not yet had a chance to
extensively litigate and appeal disputes arising from the many significant
property tax changes enacted during the 2009 legislative session, this sur-
vey period did see a number of familiar, recurring issues in the property
tax context. As is typically the case, questions relating to the ownership of
property about which there is an appraisal dispute wound their way
through the courts, and in a couple of instances made their way to the
supreme court. Refreshingly, the supreme court managed to rule in the
taxpayers' favor on both of the cases with the following fact patterns.
In Reddy Partnership/5900 North Freeway LP v. Harris County Ap-
praisal District, the supreme court held that, because a misnomer in the
taxpayer's pleading was not misleading to the opposing party, the later
correction of the pleadings to reflect the taxpayer's correct legal name
was sufficient to allow the taxpayer to sustain its dispute.123 In an opinion
on an interlocutory appeal, Morris v. Houston Independent School Dis-
trict, the supreme court held that taxpayers were allowed to assert non-
ownership of property as an affirmative defense to imposition of tax even
though the proceeding had begun with the taxpayers listed as plaintiffs
and that, as part of that pleading, the taxpayers asserted nonownership as
a basis for reimbursement of tax amounts paid under protest.12 4
The 2011 legislative session was largely quieter on the property tax
front than the previous session, which saw an especially intense flurry of
activity centered around certain long-overdue property tax reforms.125
One legislative change in House Bill 1887 addresses precisely the prob-
lem raised in the Reddy Partnership case, and may significantly reduce
confusion and resulting disputes centered around property ownership and
appeal rights.126 That legislation provides that a notice of protest may not
be found insufficient or untimely based on certain minor misidentifica-
tions of the taxpayer.127 Several provisions in House Bill 1887 and in
other bills changed certain property tax protest and appeal procedures, 128
122. See Preamble to May 16 Tex. Reg.; 3.388(b)(9), (d)(1), and (f).
123. Reddy P'ship/5900 N. Freeway LP v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 370 S.W.3d 373,
376-77 (Tex. 2012).
124. Morris v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 388 S.W.3d 310, 313 (Tex. 2012).
125. See Ohlenforst, supra note 28, at 841 (discussing property tax legislation in the
previous session).
126. Tex. H.B. 1887 § 10, 82d Leg., R.S. (2011).
127. Id.
128. See Tex. H.B. 533 § 2, 82d Leg., R.S. (2011) (establishing procedures for protesting
penalties for delinquent filing of renditions); Tex. H.B. 2203 §§ 1, 4, 82d Leg., R.S. (2011)
(extending through the end of 2013 the pilot program allowing taxpayers to appeal certain
appraisal review board determinations to the State Office of Administrative Hearings).
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the manners in which appraisal rolls may be corrected, 129 and the degree
to which appraisal review boards may be influenced by budget-conscious
chief appraisers of the boards' appraisal districts.130
IV. PROCEDURE: INCREASING TAXPAYER BURDENS?
A SUCCESSOR LIABILITY, CLAIMS FOR REFUND, RULING LETTERS,
INCONSISTENT COMPTROLLER POLICIES, LEGISLATION
Consistent with several past Surveys, this survey period includes at
least one successor liability case. Tax Code § 111.020 provides that, in
certain circumstances, "[t]he purchaser of a business or stock of goods"
may become liable for certain taxes (including sales and franchise taxes)
for which the seller was liable.' 3 ' Pursuant to this section, often referred
to colloquially as a "successor-liability" provision, the comptroller fre-
quently asserts that a buyer of a business must pay taxes that should have
been paid by the seller of the business.132 Such assertions raise a host of
issues, including what constitutes the sale of a business or stock of goods.
In addition, the comptroller generally argues, as in State v. BFI Waste
Services of Texas, LP, that the successor is not entitled to a redetermina-
tion hearing to contest the validity of the underlying assessment. 33 BFI
challenged the comptroller's position by filing a plea to the jurisdiction
and seeking dismissal of a collection suit against it, claiming that the state
must first issue a tax assessment against BFI and provide it with an op-
portunity for an administrative hearing.134
The district court granted BFI's plea to the jurisdiction, but also or-
dered that the case be abated to allow the comptroller to assess the tax
and allow BFI to request a redetermination.13 5 The court of appeals con-
cluded, however, that if the district court had no jurisdiction, then it had
no authority to abate the state's claims.136 Ultimately, the court of ap-
peals held that the district court did have subject matter jurisdiction and
remanded the case, though without meaningfully addressing BFI's asser-
tion that it deserved an administrative hearing on the substantive tax
issue.137
Faced with more class action claims regarding taxes in recent years,
courts also face procedural issues in that context. Assignees of Best Buy,
Office Max, and Comp USA v. Combs, involved consumers seeking sales
129. See Tex. S.B. 1441 § 1, 82d Leg., R.S. (2011) (allowing an appraisal review board to
correct incorrect property ownership records).
130. See Tex. H.B. 2387 § 1, 82d Leg., R.S. (2011) (allowing appraisal review boards to
retain independent general counsel).
131. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.020 (West 2008).
132. Id.
133. See State v. BFI Waste Servs., of Tex., LP, No. 03-10-00504-CV, 2011 WL 1086585,
at *1 (Tex. App-Austin 2011, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
134. Id. at *1.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at *2.
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tax refunds from the comptroller on mail-in rebates from retailers.138 The
comptroller challenged the court's subject matter jurisdiction to appoint
settlement-class counsel to represent the class in the individual refund
claims. The court noted that, unlike many of the cases cited as authority
by settlement-class counsel, which involved class claims for monetary re-
lief, the Texas class action certification provisions and relevant cases do
not support the assertion that trial courts have the power in the context
"to establish an individual attorney-client relationship between class
counsel and absent class members to allow class counsel to pursue indi-
viduals' claims in separate, non-class proceedings."1 3 9
Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Combs focused on whether the comp-
troller should have calculated interest on the gross overpayment in each
tax period rather than on the net overpayment.140 Bell alleged that the
state improperly netted Bell's tax deficiencies in each tax period against
its overpayments in the same period before calculating the interest on
each overpayment.141 Bell claimed the comptroller should have calcu-
lated interest on the gross overpayment in each tax period rather than on
the net overpayment.142
According to the court, there was no interest to be waived and no in-
terest to include in the offset because, based on the relevant statutes, un-
derpayments and overpayments in the same period will not have accrued
interest at the time specified in the Tax Code for mandatory offsets.143
The court concluded that the comptroller's netting method "is not only a
reasonable construction of the relevant Tax Code provisions, it is dictated
by the plain language of the statute."144
As part of her stated plan to overhaul a number of out-of-date rules,
the comptroller proposed revisions to the rule governing ruling letters
issued by the comptroller. Throughout the terms of multiple comptrollers,
taxpayers have sought and received-and, significantly, relied on-ruling
letters. Faced with more ruling requests than staff time and (perhaps
more significantly) with taxpayers relying on policies the comptroller no
longer wishes to follow, the comptroller has adopted a new version of
Rule 3.1.145 As revised, Rule 3.1 adopts specific guidelines for the public
138. Assignees of Best Buy, Office Max, and CompUSA v. Combs, No. D-1-GN-10-
001182, (Dist. Ct. Travis County, Tex, July 20, 2012).
139. The additional use of class action plaintiff lawyers to bring suits on behalf of taxing
jurisdictions raises additional concerns, including about the difficulty of preserving tax-
payer rights and sound tax policy in the context of such litigation.
140. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Combs, 2011 WL 6938491, *1 (Tex. App.-Austin,
2011, no pet.) (mem. op.).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at *3-4.
144. Id. (The court held that the plain language of TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.104
(West 2012) requires that any tax overpayment be applied against a tax deficiency as of the
date the tax deficiency became "due and payable.").
145. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.1 (2013) (Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Private
Letter Rulings and General Information Letters).
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to request private letter rulings and general information letters.146 The
preamble to the proposed amendments provides that "[t]he purpose of
the section is to distinguish between requests for taxability information
that is already available in the form of rules, publications, and other
agency resources and requests for taxability information in situations
where guidance is not already provided by law or by the comptroller."14 7
The preamble also acknowledges that, according to Entertainment Publi-
cations,148 the comptroller must follow the required statutory rulemaking
process, which provides for public review and input, when issuing taxabil-
ity guidance through statements of general applicability.149 Taxability let-
ters issued by the comptroller prior to the January 28, 2013 effective date
remain eligible for detrimental reliance as provided for in Rule 3.10.150
Unfortunately, the policies articulated in this rule appear designed to
make it more difficult for taxpayers to secure and rely on comptroller
rulings.
Additional amendments to Rule 3.10 (Taxpayer Bill of Rights) appear
designed to reserve for the comptroller significant discretion in deciding
whether, how, and when to respond to guidance requests, as well as to
provide for much more onerous information disclosure by requesters
before the comptroller will entertain a request.151
The comptroller also seeks to impose more onerous requirements on
taxpayers who seek sales tax refunds. Accordingly, the comptroller pro-
posed amendments to Rule 3.325 regarding refunds and payments under
protest to require more information about specific transactions.15 2 The
comptroller originally asserted that a refund request that fails to comply
fully with the comptroller's new requirements would not be considered a
valid request, and would not toll the statute of limitations. 53 In response
to significant, justified taxpayer concerns, the comptroller proposed yet
another version of Rule 3.325.154 Under revised Rule 3.325, taxpayer
would have 180 days to provide comptroller-requested documentation. 155
Significantly, regarding tolling the statute of limitations, the amended
rule identifies items that must be submitted with a refund claim in order
to toll the statute of limitations. 156 Hopefully, the comptroller's interpre-
tations of the most recent version of the rule will recognize that a refund
146. 37 Tex. Reg. 9327 (2012) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.1).
147. 37 Tex. Reg. 9327, (2012).
148. Combs v. Entm't Publ'ns, 292 S.W.3d 712, 721 (Tex. App.-Austin 2009, no pet.).
149. 37 Tex. Reg. 9327,
150. Id.
151. 37 Tex. Reg. 9330 (2012), adopted 38 Tex. Reg. 336 (2013) (codified at 34 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 3.10 (2013) (Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Taxpayer Bill of Rights)).
152. 37 Tex. Reg. 9065 (2012), adopted 38 Tex. Reg. 148 (2013) (codified at 34 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 3.325 *2913( 2013) (Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Refunds and Pay-
ments Under Protest)).
153. Id.






claim may not meet all the requirements for the comptroller to pay the
requested amount, but it may still toll the statute of limitations if it meets
certain requests.157
V. CONCLUSION
As this update illustrates, policy debates and statutory construction
battles continue to play a key role in shaping Texas tax law. The legisla-
ture adds its voice too-seeking good policy, and reacting to both tax-
payer and business demands and to requests from the comptroller and
property tax jurisdictions for broader authority to audit taxpayers and to
interpret the law.158 So . . . more to come later.
157. Id.
158. Several 2011 legislative changes increased penalties in the sales tax context. See,
e.g., TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.7075 (West Supp. 2012) (Failure to Produce Certain
Records After Using Resale Certificate; Criminal Penalty).
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